Martin Feldstein*
The substantial fall in the real level of share prices during .
the past decade has raised the cost of capital to firms and reduced their incentive to invest in new plant and equipment. l
In a previous paper (Feldstein, 1978a) , I explained how existing tax rules make the share prices of nonfinancial corporations sensitive to changes in the expected rate of inflation. An increase in the expected rate of inflation lowers the level of share prices immediately while continued inflation at any expected rate causes share prices to rise continually to maintain their real value.
A significant feature of that paper was the explicit recognition of two classes of portfolio investors: "households" that pay an income tax on dividends and interest and a capital gains * Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic
Research. This paper is part of the NBER Study of Capital Formation and will be presented at the Rochester University Research Conference on October 25 and 26, 1979. I am grateful for discussions with~lan Auerbach,. David Bradford, Jerry Green, Mervyn King, Lawrence Summers and other participants in the NBER summer institutes on Business Taxation and Finance. Thev~ws expressed in this paper are my own and not those of the NBER or Harvard University.
IThe cost of equity capital is an important component of the overall cost of capital if firms consider the repurchase of shares as an alternative to investment in new capacity (Tobin and Brainard, 1977) or if the £irms' debt-equity ratios influence the cost of additional funds (Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski, 1979) .
(l00179) tax on nominal capital gains, and "institutions" (pension funds, nonprofit organizations, etc.) that pay no tax on portfolio income or capital gains.
Both types of investors hold equity shares despite the difference between them in the relative aftertax yields on stocks and bonds because of their desire to limit risk through portfolio diversification. l In the simplified framework of the earlier paper, a rise in the expected rate of inflation unambiguously depresses the price per share that institutional investors are willing to pay but may raise the demand price that household investors are willing to pay. The change in the equilibrium share price that follows an increase in expected inflation depends on the portfolio adjustment behavior of these two types of investors.
Although the earlier analysis conveys the basic idea of how inflation affects share prices, it must be extended to provide a more realistic picture of the interaction of inflation and share prices. The present paper introduces three important aspects to the model of equilibrium share price behavior. First, the new analysis recognizes that firms borrow and that the existence of debt causes inflation to raise the firms' real after-tax earnings available for equity owners. Second, in contrast to the lMore formally, both types of investors will generally maximize expected utility by holding mixed portfolios even though, in the absence of risk aversion, the difference in the relative after-tax expected yields on stocks and bonds would cause one type of investor to hold only one type of asset. See also Feldstein and Slemrod (1978) and Feldstein and Green (1979) . assumption in the previous paper that firms distribute all earnĩ ngs as dividends, the present analysis assumes a realistic ratio of retained earnings to dividends. The effect of this is to magnify the impact on share prices of changes in inflation or other variables. Finally, the present analysis recognizes that households invest in a much wider range of assets than stocks and bonds including real estate, consumer durables, noncorporate businesses, depletable natural resources, and such "store-ofvalue" assets as land, gold and antiques; some of these investment opportunities actually become more attractive when the rate of inflation increases. l Households may also respond to lower prospective yields on stocks and bonds by increasing consumption.
The households' broad range of alternatives to investment in equities implies in general that their opportunity cost of holding shares does not vary in the same way as that of institutions and, in particular, that it does not vary only with the real net yield on bonds. This broader set of alternatives is recognized in the current analysis by explicitly relaxing (but not completely eliminating) the previous link between the real net yield on bonds and the required yield on equities.
With these extensions, the current analysis identifies six ways in which the interaction of inflation and tax rules affects share prices;
(1) Historic cost accounting for depreciation and lThe interaction of inflation and tax rules affect the net yield on these assets very differently from the way they effect either stocks or bonds; see Feldstein (1978b) on land and gold and Hendershott (1979) In considering these interactions of inflation and tax rules, it is important to distinguish households and non-taxable institutions and to recognize that share prices represent an equilibrium for these two groups. All of these ideas are developed more fully in the present paper.
Although it is analytically useful to calculate how inflation affects share prices on the assumption that the pretax return lIn evaluating the impact of inflation on the total taxes paid on the capital income of the nonfinancial corporations, it is important to bear in mind that this reduced corporate tax liability is almost exactly offset by the increased tax' liability of the creditors who must pay ta~on nominal interest receipts (see Feldstein and Summers, 1979) . 2As I emphasized in Feldstein (1978a) , this stands in sharp contrast to the popular nbtion that share prices are depressed because of high nominal interest rates.
per unit of· capital is unchanged, a fall in the share price per dollar of corporate capital would in fact reduce the equilibrium size of the corporate capital stock and thereby raise the pretax return until the share price per dollar of capital returned to its initial equilibrium. l The current paper presents some illustrative calculations of the magnitude of the fall in the equilibrium capital stock that would result under certain simplifying assumptions.
In the first section of this paper, I analyze an economy in which shares are owned only by tax exempt institutions. The more complex effects of inflation on households' demand for equity shares are examined in section 2. The third section examines the market equilibrium with both types of investors.
The limitations of the analytic structure should be stressed at the outset. The model presented here does not represent a full general equilibrium picture of the effects of inflation on share prices. Some of the values that are treated as fixed parameters should be regarded as endogenous variables in a larger system. The role and complete consequences of macroeconomic policy and debt policy remains vague. The pretax yield on capital in the noncorporate sector is not explicitly treated as an endogenous variable. The dynamic specification ignores transitional lunder certain conditions, the equilibrium share price per dollar of capital is unity but the presence of taxation may cause a different value; see Auerbach (1978) , Bradford (1979) , Feldstein and Green (1979) and King (1977) . issues and focuses ori steady state values.
I believe that the model is nevertheless rich enough and realistic enough to demons trate the principal chanels through which the interaction of inflation and tax rules affects share prices.
The present paper is not, however, an attempt to explain the total fall in the real value of share prices. The behavior of share prices during the past decade and a half may reflect not only the interaction of taxes and inflation but also the cyclical downturn in economic activity and pretax profitability, the inability of investors to evaluate real corporate earnings in an inflationary environment, investors' perception of an increased risk in equity investment, etc. l The goal of the present paper is more modest: to examine the way in which tax rules and inflation interact in affecting the share prices of nonfinancial corporations and to show that the net effect of inflation is likely to be negative. This conclusion stands in sharp contrast to papers in which Fama (1979) , Hendershott (1979) and Modigliani and Cohn (1979) have argued that the interaction of taxes and inflation has raised share prices above the even lower levels to which they would otherwise have fallen.
lFor explanations along these lines, see Fama (1979) , Hendershott (1979) , Malkiel (1978) , Modigliani and Cohn (1979) , and Summers (forthcoming).
1.
Institutional Investors Consider first an economy in which there is no inflation.
Each share of stock represents the ownership claim to a single unit of capital (i.e., one dollar's worth of capital valued at its reproduction cost) and to the net earnings that it produces.
The marginal product of capital (net of depreciation), f', is subject to a corporate income tax at effective rate T l ; in the absence of inflation, this effective rate of tax is less than the statutory rate (T) because of the combined effect of the investm ent tax credit and accelerated depreciation. The corporation IThese institutions own a significant and growing fraction of corporate stock, especially of the stock of major pUblicly traded corporations. Probably because of their exemption from capital gains taxes, these institutions account for a disproportionately large share of all transactions in equity shares. borrows b dollars per unit of capital and pays interest at rate r.
Since these interest payMents are deducted in calculating corporate income that is taxed at the statutory rate T, the net' cost of these borrowed funds is (l-T)br. The net return to equity investors per unit of capital is therefore (l-Tl)f' -(l-T)br.
To avoid the extra notation of two different corporate tax rates, I shall define the "equivalent pretax return" p to satisfy (l-T)p = (l-Pl)f'; i.e., P is the pretax rate of return which, if taxed at the statutory rate, would yield the same after-tax return as occurs when the actual pretax return is taxed at the lower "no inflation" effective tax rate. The net return to equity investors per unit of capital in the absence of inflation is thus (l-T) (p-br) .
What happens to this net return when the inflation rate rises?
For simplicity, the analysis considers an instantaneous and unanticipated increase to TI which is expected to persist £orever.
Under existing U.S. tax law, inflation raises taxable profits (for any fixed level of real profits) in two ways. First, the value of depreciation allowances is based on the original or "historic" cost of the asset rather than on its current value.
When prices rise, this historic cost method of depreciation causes the real value of depreciation to fall and the real value of taxable profits to rise. l Second, the cost of maintaining 2 S . f' . pecl lC estlmates of the magnitude of this effect are discussed below. For a more general discussion, see Feldstein Green and Sheshinski (1978) and . Hong (1977) : Motley (1969) and Van Horne and Glassmir.e (1971) Combining the basic net profits per unit of capital, the extra tax caused by the existing depreciation and inventory rules, and the real gain on net monetary liabilities yields the real net return per unit of capital:
1A1though firms in principle have the option of avoiding the extra tax by using the 1ast-in/first-out (LIFO) method of inventory accounting, a total of $7 billion in extra taxes were paid in 1977 because firms apparently regarded that as less costly in a larger sense than switching from FIFO to LIFO. lTO see more easily that this is true, it is useful to think about the corresponding aggregates. Let K be total capital and B=bK be the corresponding aggregate debt. The value of the equity shares are q(K-B) and the total equity earnings are zK. The corporate equity yield is thus zK/q(K-B) = z/q(l-b).
21 assume that d (like b) does not change with the rate of inflation. Although this is done primarily to focus attention on the more direct effects of inflation, neither ratio has changed significantly during the past 15 years. 3If p is less than 1, institutional investors would obviously prefer to have all income distributed. Because of their different tax situation, households will generally prefer some retained earnings even if p is less than 1. The distribution fraction observed in the economy reflects the firms' balancing of these conflicting interests. For an explicit model of the determination of dividend policy, see Feldstein and Green (1979) .
A simple model of share valuation implies that the price that the investor would be willing to pay per share would make the real net earnings per dollar of equity equal to the real net return on bonds, r-TI. More realistically, investors require a higher yield on equity investments than they do on the apparently less risky bonds. portfolio equilibrium condition that can be solved explicitly for the share price:
The effect of inflation on the equilibrium share price depends on the change in the real rate of interest (r-TI ) and the change in the equity earnings net of corporate income tax (z).
Econometric studies indicate that the nominal interest rate rises point-for-point with sustained changes in the rate of inflation, lThe subscript s refers to the state of the economy and can temporarily be i9nored. In general,Q' will be an increasing function of the number of shares that t~e investor holds in equilibrium.. The current assumption that all shares are held by institutional investors implies that 0is does not depend on the rate of inflation if we ignore any effect of changes in the constant inflation rate on the perceived riskiness of stocks. dr/d'IT = 1. 1 It is important to emphasize that this "Fisherian II feature of the economy is an empirical regularity and not a theoretical necessity. As Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski (1978) emphasize, the response of the nominal interest rate to inflation in an economy without government bonds depends on tax rates, depreciation rules and investor behavior.
2 The actual behavior of the interest rate depends also on government debt policy3 and on the supply of debt by noncorporate borrowers. The remainder of the paper assumes that dr/d'IT = I, i.e., that the real interest rate remains constant.
With a constant real rate of interest, equation 1.5 shows that inflation lowers the equilibrium share price if dz/d'IT < 0
IThe conclusion that inflation raises the nominal interest rate while leaving the real rate unchanged has been supported by a large number of studies.
See Fisher (1930) , Yohe and Karnovsky (1969) , Feldstein and Eckstein (1970) and, more recently, Fama (1975) and Feldstein and Summers (1978) .
2calculations by Feldstein and Summers (1978) show that, with existing tax rules, the interest rate would rise by slightly more than the rise in the rate of inflation if the difference in the real net yields on stocks and bonds for a typical individual investor is to be maintained.
They found empirically that the interest rate movement did not maintain this real net yield difference but satisfied dr/d'IT = 1. 3Feldstein (1978c) presents an explicit model of equilibrium growth that shows how different government debt policies can modify the real rate of interest in a way that is independent of the rate of inflation. and raises the equilibrium share price if dz/d1T > O. From equation
Recent values of these parameters imply that dz/d1T is negative and therefore that inflation would reduce the short-run equilibrium share price in an economy in which only tax exempt institutions own shares.
In 1977 While it is difficult to calculate~as precisely as T, b and z, it is clear that T~exceeds 0.09 and therefore that dz/d1T < O.
Recall that~1T is the overstatement of taxable profits per dollar of capital caused by inflation at rate 1T. Feldstein and Summers (1979) Two more parameter values are required to calculate explicitly the effect of inflation on the real rate of return to equity lThe index of producer prices for finished goods rOse 6.6 percent in 1977 and an average of 5.9 percent for the previous decade, essentially the same as the CPl.
2The alternative calculation is based on selecting a hypothetical investment 'and seeing how inflation changes the after-tax internal rate of return with existing tax laws.
capital: the equivalent pretax rate of return (p) and the real interest rate (r -TI). For the period from 1948 through 1976, the cyclically-adjusted rate of return on capital in the nonfinancial sector averaged 11.2 percent (Feldstein and Summers, 1977) ; = .0628
With a six percent rate of inflation, z falls to:
(1.7) The short-run equilibrium share price falls to 71 percent of its no-inflation value. Note that the proportional fall in q is nearly twice as great as the proportional fall in z, a magnification that results from recognizing the effect of retained earnings.
In considering this fall in the short-run equilibrium share price, it is important to bear in mind that it treats the risk differential (ois) as fixed. Although inflation may in fact alter the perceived riskiness of investments in stocks and bonds, this is ignored here in order to focus on the interaction of inflation anq ta~rules. In summary, in an economy with our existing tax rules but in which all shares were owned by institutions that paid no "personal"
IThis would be the appropriate calculation if the only alterñ ative to investment in corporate capital were government debt. More generally, it is necessary to recognize the changes in the relative product prices and in the allocation of labor among the sectors of the economy. The real net return to household investors per dollar of equity value is thus:
where the subscript h indicates that this is a net yield to households.
For institutional investors, portfolio equilibrium was characterized by equating this net equity yield to the sum of the real ITO see why this is rrq(l-b) note that the total real capital stock K minus the value of the debt (bK) is the capital share of the equity owners and is valued at m per unit of net capital.
Thus the total equity value is E = q(l-b)K. In addition to any retained e~rnings, the nominal value of equity rises at the rate TIE = rrq(l-b)K. The nominal gain per unit of capital is thus TIq(l-b). net yeild on bonds and a risk differential that would in general vary with the number of shares that those investors own.. For household investors, I shall adopt a similar equilibrium condit ion that the required net equity yield may be written as the sum of two components: a real net yield on alternative assets (n s ) and a risk differential that depends on the number of shares I that households own:
The subscript s on n indicates that the real net yield on alters native assets varies with the state of the economy, i.e.; with the rate of inflation.
For ordinary bonds, the real net yield is (l-m)r -TIi the assumption that dr/dTI = I implies that the real net yield on such bonds falls by the fraction m of any increase in the inflation rate. Investments in other assets are treated much more favorably in an inflationary economy. Owner-occupied housing is not affected by depreciation rules, the nominal capital gains are largely untaxed, and the deductibility of nominal mortgage interest payments reduces the real net cost of mortgage finance. Investments in nondepreciable property (land, timber, depletable resources, IThe form of the dependence of ok on the number of shares owned by households will be made expl1~it below. The value of Q will also depend on the risk per share, This additive separaBIlity assumption is obviously a simplification that would only be consistent with expected utility maximization on very stringent assumptions. gold, etc.) are also not affected by the historic cost depreciat ion rules. Although these investments entail eventual capital gains tax liabilities on their nominal appreciation, this relatively small tax is often more than offset by the tax deductibility of interest payments on the debt associated with these investments. Although investments in depreciable real estate are disadvantaged by the historic cost depreciation rule, the relatively high ratio of debt to total capital for such investments implies that even the reduction in real depreciation is often more than offset by the deductibility of nominal interest.
l On balance, therefore, inflation may lower, raise or leave unchanged the yield on alternative investments to which household investors compare the yield on equity.2 The risk premium that a household requires to hold an additional share of equity should be an increasing function of the amount of risk that the household is already bearing. This relation (and the similar one for institutiona I investors) will be discussed explicitly in section 3.
Combining equations 2.2 and 2.3 gives an explicit equation
for the price per share that household investors would be willing to pay:
he ratio of debt to total cap~tal is usually much greater for commercial real estate investments than it is for nontinancial corporat~ons in general .
. 2~he.c~ange~n n s will differ among households according to t~e~:~nd7vldual~~come tax brackets. Moreover, the new equi17br~um wlll alsq lnvolve some capitalization of yield differentlals. Because of differences in tax rates among households this capitalization cannot be complete for all households. ' with these values of m and c and the other parameter values that were obtained in section 1, it is now possible to use equation 2.5 to derive the value of n + 0h that is consistent with s s lA one percent increase in the dividend receipts of each taxpayer would increase the income tax liability by 39 percent of the additional dividends.
This calculation is done with the NBER T~XSIM model based on 1976 tax rates. 2until 1978, half of long-term gains were excludable in calculating taxable income; since then, the exclusion has increased to 60 percent. The total tax rate on capital gains also depends on the availability of the alternative tax method (until 1978) , the treatment o£ the excluded portion of gains as a tax preference, and the reduction in the amount of earned income eligible for the maximim tax provision (until 1978) . This specification implies that'n is the minimum yield on o equities that is required to induce households to own any equities at all; it is equal to the real net yield to households on the IThe flow of funds accounts for 1967 report that pensions and insurance companies owned $79 billion of corporate equities at market value. Of the $720 bi,llion of equities owned by "households ( personal trusts and nonprofit organizations," approximately $20 billion are attributable to nonprofit organizations. 2This would be most appropriate if the other assets in the households' portfolio could be treated as riskless but, in any case, the simple additive separability and proportionality specification of the required equity yield must be regarded as a useful approximation rather than a general result. The equilibrium share price and distribution of share ownership at any inflation rate must satisfy three conditions: the institutional portfolio balance condition, the household portfolio balance condition, and the requirement that the total demand for shares by households and institutions equals the existing supply.
In the short run, with the stock of capital fixed, this provides three equations that simultaneously determine q , Sh and S . . In s . s 1S the long-run, the share price must equal one and the three equations determine the equilibrium size of the corporate capital stock and its distribution between households and institutions.
Consider first the short-run equilibrium with a fixed stock of capital and a fixed number of shares S. The institutional portfolio balance condition can be written (from 1.4);
lThis is based on household ownership of $700 billion of equi·ties at market value in 1967. 
Finally, the demand for shares must equal the fixed supply: (3.8) These six equations determine the equilibrium share price q, the share ownership of households and institutions (Sis and~s) and the incidental parameters z, 0. and 0h . Equities remained at 55 percent of private pension assets and rose from 9 percent of the assets of state and local government employee retirement funds to 23 percent. Among insurance companies, equities remained at 11 percent of total assets. Thus institutions as a whole increased the fraction of their assets devoted to equities. Since the total assets of these institutions also rose some faster than the total assets of households, the fraction of equities held by households declined from about 88 percent to about 78 percent. The equilibrium conditions of equations 3.3 through 3.8 can now be used to calculate the change in the pretax rate of return 3 that is required for long-run equilibrium. Instead of regarding lRelative to the actual increase during the period of inflation described in the previous footnote, 2See above, page 2~where it is noted that any fall greater than 0.015 would raise household demand for shares. IMore generally, the capital is also reduced in other activities that are more heavily taxed because of inflation.
Conclusion
The analysis in this paper has shown that, because of existing tax rules, a permanent increase in the expected rate of inflation will depress the price of equity shares and will reduce the size of the equilibrium capital stock in the affected industries. This conclusion is based on calculations that use likely values of the tax and financial variables and that explicitly recognize the important roles of debt finance and retained earnings.
A number of other recent studies that have reached the opposite conclusion (that the interaction of taxes and inflation does not depress share prices) are based on a faulty or incomplete description of the tax effects. For example, Fama (1979) concludes that taxes could not be responsible for the fall in real share values during the 1970's because the ratio of corporate taxes to gross corporate income (before subtracting depreciation and real interest payments) has fallen since the 1960's. I do not understand the purpose of this comparison since the denominator does not refer to equity income and the numerator does not include all of the taxes paid by equity investors. Modigliani and Cohn (1979) refer to the fact that inflation reduces the real value of depreciation but 1 underestimate the magnitude of this effect by more than 60 percent.
They~lso ignore the extra tax on the portfolio investors and the way in which the interaction of inflation and taxes alters the real net yields available on alternative assets. Hendershott's (1979) extension and critique of There are of courSf, 2, number of vlays in vJhich the present s-etldy could be extended and strenqthened. Like any model of a single market, the results could be improved by imbedding the current model in a mor~complete general Gquilibri~m system. In lModigli,ani and Cohn est.imate the effe::::t of inflation on allmvable depreciation by the capital consumption adjustment CCCA) estimated by the Department of Commerce. The CCA actually J:'eflects two countervailing differences b~tween real st~aiqht~line depreciation and the depreciation allowed for tax purposes: acceleration makffitax-deductible depreciation exceed straight~line depreciation while inflation reduces the value of tax-deductible depreciation. In 1977, for example, the "acceleration component!' raised tax deductible depreciation by $25.0 billion while the ,. inflation component" reduced tax depreciation by $39.7 billion. The $14.7 billion difference between 'these two is the net CCA figure of the type used by Modigliani and Cohn; it is only 37 percent of the true reduction in depreciation caused by inflation.
(Although the "acceleration component" grew during the 1970's, this was almost entirely due to changes in tax laws in the 1960's"and to the growth of investment. The favorable tax rules and the likely future would therefore have been anticipated in the late 1960's and reflected in share prices at that time. Only the subsequent unanticipated inflation and the associated loss of real depreciation would affect subsequent share price moments.) this way, the effect of reductions in the stock of nonfiancial corporate capital on the yields in other markets could be explicitly
evaluated. An explicit model of the adjustment of the capital stock would permit a more accurate evaluation of the initial change in price. A better empirical specification of the yields on the alternative assets in the household's portfolio would also be desirable.
Finally, a more general specification of the other factors that influence the movement of share prices is a necessary prerequisite to direct empirical measurement of the extent to which the poor performance of the stock market during the 1970's is due to the interaction of inflation and existing tax rules. The current appendix uses the "hypothetical project" technique that I employed with Lawrence Summers in an earlier study (Feldstein and Surruners, 1978) . This method is completely free of the recent historic experience. It nevertheless produces a value of the depreciation parameter (say, 1.1 1 ' that is extremely close to the estimate based on the national account data. The similarity of the two results provides substantial support for this value.
Consider' a ., standard investment" that in the absence of taxes 1 has an internal rate of return of 12 percent. Let the nominal rate of return that the firm can afford to pay for funds invested in this project.
In the qbsence of tax this would be 12 percent; with pure debt finance and economic depreciation, the firm could pay this nominal return regardless of the corporate income tax. But less than economic depreciation would reduce this maximum potential rate 2 of return.
The Feldstein-Summers study considered how a 6 percent inflation would change the maximum potential interest rate that a firm could pay.on the standard project if the project was financed with one-third debt and two-thirds equity and if the real net equity yield to typical individual investors had to exceed their real net yield on debt by 6 percent. The analysis showed that a maximum potential nominal interest rate of 3.3 percent with no inflation would rise to 11.3 percent with a 6 percent inflation. 3 The assumption of one-third debt finance and a 6 percent yield differential implies that a 6 percent inflation rate would lower the total ------IThe "standard investment" is actually a mix of equipment and structures, each with its own exponential output decay structure. See Feldstein and Summers, 1978, page 67 . The earlier study found i = 0.033 when TI = a and i = 0.113 when TI = 0.06. These imply 2 = .0709 when TI = a and 2 = ,0656 when TI = 0.06. In the present paper, T~TI is the change in 2 induced by the effect of historic cost depreciation; using this would implỹ = 0.363. But the Feldstein-Summers calculation assumes a rise in t~e real interest rate and ther.ef.ore an understateme.nt of~l' The total nominal return that the firm pays for~unds is N~bC.l-T)i + 2 + (l-b)TI. In the absence of inflation, N = 0.0764 while at TI = .06, N =0.1244.
The real return on c~pital falls from 0.0764 to 0.0694, a fall of 0.012.
